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Vendor and Purchaser-ABROATION OF CAVEAT EMPTOR IN NEw HoME
SALEs BY BUILDER-VENDORS-SMith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d
795 (Mo. 1972); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
Protection against latent defects exists for the purchaser of a forty-nine
cent ball point pen under an implied warranty of merchantability,' but no
such protection prevails for the vendee of a $50,000 home in the absence of
fraud, misrepresentation, or an express warranty of condition and habita-
bility.2 Such is the anomaly created by the doctrine of caveat emptor,3 still
ruthlessly applied in a majority of American jurisdictions.4 In two cases
recently adjudicated, Elderkin v. Gaster5 and Smith v. Old Warson Develop-
ment Co.,6 the courts abandoned caveat emptor in the sales of new homes by
builder-vendors where latent defects are at issue, adopting the civil law
maxim caveat venditor.7
In Elderkin the vendee of a newly constructed home sought equitable
relief against the builder-vendor due to the latter's failure to furnish a
potable water supply." While both the contract of sale and the deed were
1See UNIoFR COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to 319.
2 See 55 Amr. Jum. Sales § 368 (1946).
8 The maxim caveat enptor was based upon the fact that buyer and seller dealt at
arm's length, on equal footing, and that the vendee had all the means and opportunity
necessary to secure the same knowledge of the subject matter as the vendor. Thus, unless
the vendee secured an express warranty as to the quality of the product, he could not
look to the law for protection. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922,
924 (1970); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1968). See generally Hamil-
ton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Roberts, The Case
of The Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52A CoRN_.sl L.Q. 835
(1967).4 See Walton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753, 131 S.E.2d 655 (1963); Allen v. Wilkinson,
250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968); Harmon Nat'l Real Estate Corp. v. Egan, 137 Misc.
297, 241 N.Y.S. 708 (1930); Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
Closely allied with caveat emptor is the doctrine of merger of the contract of sale
into the deed, so as to extinguish any obligations not expressly provided for in the deed.
The majority of jurisdictions invariably apply this common law doctrine in defeating
implied warranties. See Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 NJ. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717
(App. Div. 1957); Harmon Nat'1 Real Estate Corp. v. Egan, 137 Misc. 297, 241 N.Y.S.
708 (1930).
5 447 Pa. 118, 288 A2d 771 (1972).
6479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
7The civil law is typified by the Louisiana doctrine of redhibition which implies a
warranty of quality to sales of new and used real property as well as to sales of chattels.
LA. CQv. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1952).
8 After plaintiff (vendee) moved into the new home, it was discovered that the water
from the private well constructed by defendant was unfit for human consumption be-
cause it contained an excessive nitrate concentration as well as synthetic detergents.
Defendant offered to re-drill only on condition that plaintiff accept his act as full
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silent as to warranties of quality,9 the Pennsylvania court, basing its decision
on the vendee's reliance on the builder's skills, abrogated caveat emptor in
the sales of new homes, thus extending implied warranties of habitability
to include all latent defects. The builder-vendor was held not only to war-
rant impliedly the quality of construction of the well itself, but more im-
portant, the quality of the water to be drawn from it. Smith involved the
applicability of an implied warranty of merchantable fitness and quality
where the concrete foundation of a completed house began to settle be-
yond reasonable limits.' Likening the builder-vendor's liability to strict
liability in tort, and citing reliance by the vendee," the Missouri court ex-
tended to first purchasers of homes from builder-vendors the same protec-
tion afforded purchasers of manufactured goods under 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.12
The growing minority of states extending implied warranties to real estate
transactions 3 recognize that the vendee and builder-vendor of mass produced
performance of his duty. This was refused by plaintiff, who demanded potable water.
Testimony established the costs of running public water to the Elderkin home to be in
excess of $14,000. Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, -n.-, 288 A.2d 771, 773 n.8 (1972).
9 The only mention of water was that it was to be supplied by "individual [private]
system." No warranties of quality either for construction of the well or quality of the
water were included in the contract of sale or deed. Id. at -, 288 A.2d at 773.
10 Plaintiff moved into his $82,500 home, and within a few months noticed doors stick-
ing and cracks developing in the walls. The problems associated with the settling were
limited to two rooms constructed on a concrete slab; evidence showed that they had
settled as much as an inch and three quarters in one location. Smith v. Old Watson
Dev. Co., 479 S.V.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
11 The most common reason assigned by those jurisdictions accepting implied warran-
ties in realty transactions is that of reliance by the amateurish vendee on the professional
sills and reputation of the builder. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d
922 (1970); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). See also Haskell, The
Case For An Implied Warranty of Quality In Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633
(1965).
12REsTATEMErT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). Several jurisdictions have allowed
recovery for damages caused by defects in a new home where there is physical injury,
but none, prior to Smith, have allowed recovery on that basis absent physical injury. See
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Rothberg v. Olenik, -Vt.-,
262 A.2d 461 (1970).
13The number of American jurisdictions applying implied warranties to the sales of
new homes by builder-vendors now numbers fifteen, although they accept the warran-
ties in varying degrees. See Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971)
(warranty of fitness and habitability); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922
(1970) (warranty of fitness); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74
Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (warranty of fitness); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388
P.2d 399 (1964) (warranty of fitness); Bethlahmy v. Bechel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698
(1966) (warranty of fitness); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180
N.W.2d 503 (1970) (warranty of fitness); Smith v. Old Watson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d
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homes do not occupy equal bargaining positions, and that the vendee lacks
the sophistication required to protect himself in a contract or deed against
latent defects in construction. Implied warranties have now been held to
cover defects such as inadequate plumbing,14 defective chimney flues, 15 and
excessively hot water,1 on the simple basis that a home fit for habitation
is necessarily within the contemplation of both parties, and that these defects
violate that mutual understanding. Although first applied only to sales of
new homes to be constructed or under construction,17 the implied warranties
have been extended to new homes regardless of the stage of completion.' s
The Pennsylvania court in Elderkin, having previously adopted implied
warranties of reasonable workmanship, 19 announced a more inclusive implied
warranty of habitability applicable to new home purchases. Recognizing
that the majority of cases accepting implied warranties have done so only
795 (Mo. 1972) (strict liability in tort); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965) (warranty of fitness where defect results in personal injury); Elder-
kin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972) (warranty of habitability); Rutledge v.
Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970) (warranty of workmanlike construction
and suitability for habitation); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc, 83 S.D. 57, 154
N.W.2d 803 (1967) (warranty of workmanlike construction); Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (warranty of proper construction); Rothberg v. Olenik, -Vt.-,
262 A.2d 461 (1970) (warranty of fitness); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457
P.2d 199 (1969) (warranty of fitness for habitation); LA. Civ. CoDE Am. art. 2520
(West 1952) (warranty of merchantability).
l4 Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958). Contra,
Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959) (holding defective refrigeration and
heating systems in new home not to be covered by implied warranties).
15 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
16 In the leading New Jersey case applying implied warranties, the son of the pur-
chaser's lessee was severely scalded by water drawn from bathroom faucets. The builder-
vendor was held liable under an implied warranty and strict liability in tort for failure
to provide a mixing valve to reduce the water temperature. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
17 The first departure from the strict application of caveat emptor in realty sales came
in the English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd, [1931] 2 K.B. 113, which held
that an implied warranty of quality existed for homes purchased in the course of con-
struction, for the obvious reason that the purchaser had no opportunity to inspect the
finished product at the time of sale.
The first American cases held along the same lines as the English case, holding that
the builder-vendor warranted that the incomplete house would be completed in a work-
manlike manner. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
See also Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co, 36 11. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962).
18The precedent setting case of Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399
(1964) held "[ihat a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is
near competion than would apply to one who purchases a new house, seems incon-
gruous." Id. at -, 388 P.2d at 402.
19 Koval v. Country and Town, Inc, 9 Cumb. L.J. 109 (C.P. 1958).
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as to structural defects,20 the court held the builder-vendor liable for defects
resulting from the unsuitable nature of the building site,21 including within
this liability the failure to furnish a potable water supply. But, while adopt-
ing the implied warranty of habitability, the court failed to adopt a standard
for determining "habitability," leaving the extent of the builder-vendor's
liability unknown.
Whereas the Pennsylvania court broadened existing implied warranties,
the Missouri court in Smith ruled for the first time that implied warranties
of merchantable quality and fitness do exist in new home purchases. The
court evidenced its unwillingness to go to the extreme of the Elderkin case
by declaring the builder-vendor to be liable under an implied warranty only
for those defects developing in the manufactured product, and not for any
defects in the realty.22 More important, the purchaser of a new home was
held entitled to the same protection afforded the purchaser of any manu-
factured goods as set forth in 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts3
2o Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) held an implied warranty
of workmanlike construction using good materials to cover "major structural features,"
including within that category underground water permeating plaintiff's basement floor
and walls because of the builder's failure to waterproof.
21 The Elderkin court relied on several cases which held the builder-vendor liable for
defects in the soil. See Mulhern v. Hederich, 163 Colo. 275, 403 P.2d 469 (1967) (failure
to protect against soil defects causing excessive settling); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev.,
Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (basement leakage due to underground spring);
House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (instability of the land causing
the foundation to crumble).
22 The court also addressed itself to the question of the builder-vendor's liability to
the vendee for defects caused, not by his negligence, but by the negligence or fault of a
supplier of defective materials used on the job. In reversing Whaley v. Milton Constr.
& Supply Co., 241 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1951), which held the builder not to be liable for
defective materials supplied him, the Smith court held that "fault or negligence of the
warrantor is no longer required for recovery under implied warranty." Smith v. Old
Watson Dev. Co, 479 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. 1972).
23 The Restatement rule establishes strict liability on a seller of products, making
him liable to the consumer, or user even though the seller has exercised the highest
degree of care in the preparation and sale of the product. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment a, at 348 (1965).
Prior decisions have applied strict liability to builder-vendors under this provision, but
only where the defect by the builder resulted in physical injury. 402A had not been used,
prior to Smith, to establish the builder-vendor's liability for the actual defect. See, e.g.,
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Rothberg
v. Olenik, -Vt.-, 262 A.2d 461 (1970).
In commenting on the trend toward allowing recovery for physical injuries suffered
as a result of defects in new homes, an excellent article on the rule of caveat emptor,
Bearman, Caveat Emptor In Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon The Rule, 14 VAND.
L. REv. 541 (1961) said:
The extension of the McPherson theory to realty in effect places upon the
builder-vendor an implied warranty against structural defects upon which the
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Although the purchase of a new home is considered a real estate transac-
tion, the court reasoned that it is in fact the purchase of a "manufactured
product," 24 and the purchaser should have the protection accompanying
such a purchase. 25
The importance of Elderkin is that the defect, an impure water supply,
was not in the buildings and furnishings ordinarily associated with the
builder's liability, but rather in the condition of the land itself. Thus; the
builder-vendor was held to warrant the quality of the subsurface water over
which he had no control under normal circumstances. While it is desirable
that the vendee be protected in his bargain, by this application the builder-
vendor becomes an insurer of the land he sells as well as the house he builds.28
The builder then is clearly in a position to lose the bargain for which he
has contracted, for example, because of the added expense incurred by more
extensive drilling, or pumping water from another source. 27 While it is true
that the vendee has contracted for a habitable home, necessarily intendiig
potable water, an expedient means of acquiring it must also be within the
contemplation of the parties. If an implied warranty is adopted to the injury
of the builder-vendor, then the rationale for the warranty has been com-
pletely overlooked, resulting in the vendee now occupying a potentially
vendee can sue should injury occur because of the defects. It would not seem
too great a step for future courts to take, to reason that, if such a 'warranty' exists
when an injury has occurred, there is no reason to say that it does not exist when
the vendee sues his vendor who is also the builder, not to redress an injury
but simply to establish the structural quality and good workmanship in his house.
2 .. Id. at 570.
Smith v. Old Watson Dev. Co, 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1972).
2G The problem of the doctrine of merger was solved by reasoning based on tort
principles, to which the laws of contract have no application. The court held that'the
plaintiffs' right to recover arises "as a matter of law from their purchase of the house,
not from their sale contract or the deed.' Id. at 800.
The Pennsylvania court, when confronted with the doctrine of merger in Elderkin,
nearly applied a corollary to the doctrine of merger, holding that the delivery of the
deed does not foreclose inquiry into those matters not intended to be controlled by the
deed, or that are collateral to the deed. Elderiin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, -, 288 A2d
771, 774 & n.11 (1972).
20One should note that the majority of the courts adopting implied warranties do not
require that a perfect house be built, but rather that the measure of the builder-vendor's
liability is reasonableness of quality. This still leaves undetermined the question of what
is "reasonable" quality of construction, and to what degree the builder will be held a
warrantor of the land. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966);
Smith v. Old Watson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
271n Elderkin the evidence showed that the cost to defendant builder of supply-
ing water from a public source would exceed $14,000, illustrating to what extent the
builder stands to lose his bargain. Quaere: If plaintiff in Elderkin had purchased the lot
from someone other than the builder-vendor, and then had contracted with defendant
to build the house under the same terms, would the court have held as it did?
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superior bargaining position 2 8 rather than the equal bargaining positions
sought by the courts.
Granting that an implied warranty is beneficial in equalizing vendee and
builder-vendor rights,29 the recognition by the Missouri court of the true
nature of new home sales is favored in promotion of fairness between vendee
and builder-vendor. By accepting strict liability as applicable to manufac-
tured products, the liability of the builder-vendor is established for defects
in his manufactured dwelling, while protection against liability for defects
in the land is afforded the builder. Under such a policy the rights of the
vendee to a habitable home are protected, and the builder-vendor does not
come under the inequitable burden of an insurer of the quality of the land,
as occurred in Elderkin. The abrogation of caveat emptor in new home sales
should not be extended to include latent defects in the quality of the land.
Such a policy will result in infringement on the rights of the builder. By
recognizing, as the Missouri court has, the "product nature" of new home
sales, the builder-vendor is liable for defects in the new home, and caveat
emptor remains undisturbed as to land, achieving an equitable solution in
insuring the rights of both parties.20
E.A.B.
28The vendee is not absolutely elevated to a superior bargaining position although he
is now receiving by implication of law protection for which he would once have had
to pay in the form of an express warranty from the builder. The builder, for example,
loses nothing where the defect he is held to warrant is required by statute as in the
case of sewer regulations.
The builder who contracts with a purchaser to build according to a set of plans
supplied by the purchaser will not be affected by an implied warranty of fitness. By
the great weight of authority, a contractor who has followed plans furnished by the
vendee is not liable for defects due to the insufficiency of the plans or defects resulting
therefrom. See Fuchs v. Parsons Constr. Co., 172 Neb. 719, 111 N.W.2d 727 (1961); Hill
v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951). See generally 6 A.L.R.3d 1393
(1966).
29 7 WILLISTON, CoNTRACrs § 926A (3 ed. 1963): "It would be much better if this en-
lightened approach were generally adopted with respect to the sale of new houses for it
would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerrybuilding that has become
perceptible over the years."
3oFor an excellent discussion of the problems involving implied warranties as applied
to new home sales, and for recommended revisions of the law, see Haskel, The Case
Por An Implied Warranty of Quality In Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. LJ. 633 (1965).
